{ "$schema": "./community-sources.schema.json", "programme": "Data Intelligence for Communities — Safer Online. Stronger Together.", "surface": "/data-intelligence/#community", "registerSection": "CLAIMS_REGISTER.md §10", "verificationMethod": "Each entry was checked on lastVerified against the linked primary page (direct fetch, or the publisher's own index page when the primary page blocks automated fetch). Values are quoted as published. Nothing here is a result of the programme.", "rule": "A figure may appear on the page only if its entry here has status VERIFIED and the page shows the population, period, limitation and source next to it. Concern or trust percentages are never presented as misinformation prevalence.", "claims": [ { "id": "DNR26-CONCERN-62", "claim": "62% of surveyed online news users are concerned about what is real and what is fake online", "value": "62%", "publication": "Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Digital News Report 2026 — Overview and key findings (Jim Egan)", "publicationDate": "2026-06-16", "studyPeriod": "2026 survey wave (annual online survey; fieldwork early 2026 per the report methodology)", "population": "Online news consumers in 48 markets, approximately 2,000 respondents per market", "geography": "48 markets; cross-market average", "method": "Online survey (YouGov) of adults who consumed news in the past month", "verbatim": "The proportion concerned about fake news online more broadly has also risen this year to a figure of 62% of respondents globally (up 4pp).", "limitation": "Measures respondents' concern, not the proportion of online content that is false. Not a Philippines-only figure.", "sourceUrl": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2026/dnr-executive-summary", "harvard": "Egan, J. (2026) 'Overview and key findings of the 2026 Digital News Report'. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 16 June.", "displayedOn": [ "page" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "direct fetch of source page" }, { "id": "DNR26-PH-TRUST-28", "claim": "28% overall trust in news among Philippine respondents", "value": "28%", "publication": "Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Digital News Report 2026 — Philippines country page (Yvonne T. Chua)", "publicationDate": "2026-06-16", "studyPeriod": "2026 survey wave", "population": "Philippine online news consumers surveyed for the Digital News Report (country sample per the report methodology)", "geography": "Philippines", "method": "Online survey (YouGov); 'trust most news most of the time'", "verbatim": "Overall trust in news: 28% (-10). Global average: 37%", "limitation": "A survey measure of trust, not an audit of news accuracy. Down 10 percentage points on the previous year. Does not mean the remaining 72% believe misinformation.", "sourceUrl": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2026/philippines", "harvard": "Chua, Y.T. (2026) 'Philippines', Digital News Report 2026. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 16 June.", "displayedOn": [ "page" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "direct fetch of source page" }, { "id": "WHO24-CYBER-15", "claim": "15% of surveyed adolescents (around 1 in 6) reported being cyberbullied", "value": "15%", "publication": "WHO Regional Office for Europe, news release on the HBSC study", "publicationDate": "2024-03-27", "studyPeriod": "HBSC survey 2021/2022", "population": "More than 279,000 young people aged 11, 13 and 15", "geography": "44 countries and regions across Europe, Central Asia and Canada", "method": "Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) self-report survey", "verbatim": "15% of adolescents (around 1 in 6) have experienced cyberbullying", "limitation": "International context only; not a Philippine prevalence estimate. Boys 15%, girls 16%; up from 12% and 13% in the previous cycle.", "sourceUrl": "https://www.who.int/europe/news/item/27-03-2024-one-in-six-school-aged-children-experiences-cyberbullying--finds-new-who-europe-study", "harvard": "WHO Regional Office for Europe (2024) 'One in six school-aged children experiences cyberbullying, finds new WHO/Europe study', 27 March.", "displayedOn": [ "page" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "direct fetch of source page" }, { "id": "OII21-MANIP-81", "claim": "Organised social media manipulation documented in 81 countries", "value": "81 countries", "publication": "Oxford Internet Institute, Industrialized Disinformation: 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation (Bradshaw, Bailey and Howard)", "publicationDate": "2021", "studyPeriod": "2020", "population": "Countries with documented organised social media manipulation campaigns", "geography": "Global inventory", "method": "Research inventory of publicly documented campaigns", "verbatim": "81 countries", "limitation": "A historical research inventory, not a 2026 count, and not evidence that 81 election results were changed.", "sourceUrl": "https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/industrialized-disinformation/", "harvard": "Bradshaw, S., Bailey, H. and Howard, P.N. (2021) Industrialized Disinformation: 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation. Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute.", "displayedOn": [ "page" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "direct fetch of source page" }, { "id": "COMELEC-BSKE-2026", "claim": "The Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections are currently scheduled for 2 November 2026; a bill to postpone them to November 2028 has passed both houses of Congress and awaits the President's decision", "value": "2 November 2026 (scheduled; postponement bill pending)", "publication": "COMELEC calendar as reported by the Philippine Information Agency; postponement status per Philippine News Agency and The Manila Times", "publicationDate": "2026-09-16", "studyPeriod": "n/a", "population": "n/a", "geography": "Philippines", "method": "Official calendar and news reporting", "verbatim": "Election Day is fixed on November 2, 2026 (COMELEC calendar via PIA). Marcos to review bill postponing BSKE (PNA, 16 September 2026).", "limitation": "Time-sensitive. House Bill 10376 (postponement to November 2028) passed the House on 8 September 2026 and the Senate the following week; presidential action was pending on lastVerified. Recheck before any programme material is released.", "sourceUrl": "https://pia.gov.ph/news/comelec-bares-2026-bske-calendar-reminds-public-of-election-laws/", "additionalSources": [ "https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1284091", "https://www.manilatimes.net/2026/09/16/news/national/marcos-to-review-bill-postponing-bske/2425838" ], "harvard": "Philippine Information Agency (2026) 'COMELEC bares 2026 BSKE calendar, reminds public of election laws'; Philippine News Agency (2026) 'Marcos to review bill postponing BSKE polls', 16 September.", "displayedOn": [ "page" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "recheckBeforeRelease": true, "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "publisher index pages (PIA page blocks automated fetch); Wikipedia 2026 BSKE article cross-checked" }, { "id": "NATURE26-XFEED", "claim": "A seven-week 2023 field experiment with about 4,965 US users of X found that the algorithmic feed shifted some measured political attitudes; neither switching the algorithm on nor off significantly affected affective polarisation or self-reported partisanship", "value": "no significant change in partisanship or affective polarisation", "publication": "Nature, vol. 652, pp. 416–423 (Gauthier, Hodler, Widmer and Zhuravskaya)", "publicationDate": "2026-02-18", "studyPeriod": "July to September 2023, 7 weeks", "population": "About 4,965 active US-based X users, randomly assigned", "geography": "United States", "method": "Randomised field experiment with browser-extension feed monitoring", "verbatim": "Neither switching the algorithm on nor switching it off significantly affected affective polarization or self-reported partisanship.", "limitation": "One platform, one country, one seven-week window in 2023. Does not establish effects on votes or election results.", "sourceUrl": "https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-026-10098-2", "additionalSources": [ "https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC13061628/" ], "doi": "10.1038/s41586-026-10098-2", "harvard": "Gauthier, G., Hodler, R., Widmer, P. and Zhuravskaya, E. (2026) 'The political effects of X's feed algorithm', Nature, 652, pp. 416–423. doi: 10.1038/s41586-026-10098-2.", "displayedOn": [ "page" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "PubMed Central full text (nature.com requires a browser session)" }, { "id": "SCIENCE23-FEEDS", "claim": "During the 2020 US election, switching Facebook and Instagram users to chronological feeds substantially changed time on platform and content exposure but did not significantly alter issue polarisation, affective polarisation, political knowledge or other key attitudes over three months", "value": "no significant change in measured attitudes over 3 months", "publication": "Science, vol. 381, issue 6656, pp. 398–404 (Guess et al.)", "publicationDate": "2023-07-27", "studyPeriod": "2020 US election period, 3-month study window", "population": "Consenting US Facebook and Instagram users assigned to reverse-chronological feeds", "geography": "United States", "method": "Randomised experiment on platform", "verbatim": "Despite these substantial changes in users' on-platform experience, the chronological feed did not significantly alter levels of issue polarization, affective polarization, political knowledge, or other key attitudes during the 3-month study period.", "limitation": "Two platforms, one country, one election period. Does not establish effects on votes or election results.", "sourceUrl": "https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/how-do-social-media-feed-algorithms-affect-attitudes-and-behavior/", "doi": "10.1126/science.abp9364", "harvard": "Guess, A.M. et al. (2023) 'How do social media feed algorithms affect attitudes and behavior in an election campaign?', Science, 381(6656), pp. 398–404. doi: 10.1126/science.abp9364.", "displayedOn": [ "page" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "direct fetch of institutional repository page" }, { "id": "FCC24-DEEPFAKE", "claim": "In May 2024 the US FCC proposed a US$6 million fine over robocalls before the January 2024 New Hampshire primary that used an AI-generated clone of President Biden's voice with spoofed caller ID; the fine was issued in September 2024", "value": "US$6 million", "publication": "US Federal Communications Commission, enforcement documents", "publicationDate": "2024-05-23", "studyPeriod": "January 2024 New Hampshire primary", "population": "n/a (enforcement action)", "geography": "United States", "method": "Regulatory enforcement record", "verbatim": "WASHINGTON, May 23, 2024—The Federal Communications Commission today proposed a substantial fine for apparently illegal robocalls made using deepfake, AI-generated voice cloning technology and caller ID spoofing to spread election misinformation to potential New Hampshire voters prior to the January primary. Steve Kramer faces a $6 million proposed fine for apparent spoofing violations. Two days before the New Hampshire 2024 presidential primary election, illegally spoofed and malicious robocalls carried a deepfake audio recording of President Biden’s cloned voice", "limitation": "A single documented US case used to illustrate the mechanism; not evidence about Philippine elections.", "sourceUrl": "https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-6-million-fine-deepfake-robocalls-around-nh-primary", "additionalSources": [ "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-402762A1.pdf", "https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-issues-6m-fine-election-interference-deepfake-robocalls" ], "harvard": "Federal Communications Commission (2024) 'FCC Proposes $6 Million Fine for Deepfake Robocalls Around NH Primary', 23 May.", "displayedOn": [ "page" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "press release PDF DOC-402762A1 (text extracted 2026-09-22); fcc.gov document index for the September 2024 forfeiture order" }, { "id": "OECD24-FACTS", "claim": "The OECD's 2024 framework addresses disinformation through three complementary dimensions: transparency, accountability and plurality of information sources; societal resilience; and governance measures and institutions", "value": "three dimensions", "publication": "OECD, Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity", "publicationDate": "2024-03", "studyPeriod": "n/a", "population": "n/a", "geography": "OECD members", "method": "Policy framework", "verbatim": "implementing policies to enhance the transparency, accountability, and plurality of information sources; fostering societal resilience to disinformation; and upgrading governance measures and public institutions to uphold the integrity of the information space", "limitation": "A policy framework, not an outcome measure.", "sourceUrl": "https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/facts-not-fakes-tackling-disinformation-strengthening-information-integrity_d909ff7a-en.html", "doi": "10.1787/d909ff7a-en", "harvard": "OECD (2024) Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity. Paris: OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/d909ff7a-en.", "displayedOn": [ "docs" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "oecd.org publication index" }, { "id": "GFM-UNSUPPORTED-PH", "claim": "GoFundMe cannot send funds directly to the Philippines; an organiser in a supported country is personally responsible for receiving and transferring funds and must outline a transparent transfer plan on the fundraiser", "value": "Philippines not supported for payouts", "publication": "GoFundMe Help Center — Countries supported on GoFundMe; Raising funds for someone in an unsupported country", "publicationDate": "current help-centre articles", "studyPeriod": "n/a", "population": "n/a", "geography": "Philippines", "method": "Platform policy", "verbatim": "the fundraiser organizer will be personally responsible for receiving the funds, then delivering the funds outside of GoFundMe … outline a transparent plan for the transfer of funds on the fundraiser", "limitation": "Platform policy can change; recheck at fundraiser set-up.", "sourceUrl": "https://support.gofundme.com/hc/en-us/articles/360001972748-Countries-supported-on-GoFundMe", "additionalSources": [ "https://support.gofundme.com/hc/en-us/articles/115010242608-Raising-funds-for-someone-in-an-unsupported-country" ], "harvard": "GoFundMe (n.d.) 'Countries supported on GoFundMe' and 'Raising funds for someone in an unsupported country'. Help Center.", "displayedOn": [ "docs" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "support.gofundme.com index (article pages block automated fetch)" }, { "id": "DSWD-PD1564", "claim": "Under PD 1564 anyone soliciting or receiving contributions for charitable or public-welfare purposes must first secure a DSWD public solicitation permit; online activity with a donate button or visible bank details is covered", "value": "permit required before solicitation", "publication": "DSWD HELPS — Public Solicitation FAQ", "publicationDate": "current FAQ", "studyPeriod": "n/a", "population": "n/a", "geography": "Philippines", "method": "Regulatory guidance", "verbatim": "Presidential Decree No. 1564, otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law, mandates any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes to first secure a permit. … any act or activity that insinuates monetary donation such as a donate button and visible bank details on any social media platforms", "limitation": "Eligibility categories include individuals with endorsements from social welfare agencies, faith-based groups, NGOs and organised groups; legal counsel to confirm the applicable path.", "sourceUrl": "https://helps.dswd.gov.ph/Home/PubSolFAQ/", "harvard": "Department of Social Welfare and Development (n.d.) 'Public Solicitation FAQ'. DSWD HELPS.", "displayedOn": [ "docs" ], "status": "VERIFIED", "lastVerified": "2026-09-22", "verifiedVia": "direct fetch of source page" } ], "notClaimed": [ "Any share of Filipinos who are manipulated, deceived or radicalised online", "Any programme result (sessions delivered, people reached, knowledge gained) — none exists yet", "Registered charity, foundation or non-profit status for InsightPulseAI or Dataverse IT Consultancy", "A DSWD solicitation permit, a live fundraiser, donation totals, beneficiaries or partner endorsements", "That any feed, advertiser or technology decided a Philippine election, or that InsightPulseAI can identify who 'controlled' one" ] }